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Introduction 
This chapter explores the Western perceptions of Kurdistan and Kurdish political agency in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These perceptions had an important impact on Kurdish political 
elite’s pursuit of national legitimacy in this period and continue to remain to have an influence on Kurdish 
politics today. This chapter seeks to answer a number of questions: What were the underpinning ideas 
behind the orientalist and western perceptions of the Kurds in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries? How did these influence Kurdish political elite’s engagement with international actors and the 
Ottoman Empire? How did this engagement shape Kurdish political movements and their pursuit of 
political legitimacy? In addressing these questions, the chapter connects western imperial powers’ activities 
in the Ottoman territories with the construction of Kurdish national identity and the development of 
Kurdish politics since then. It shows that ethnographic maps of the region produced by Western 
geographers were adopted and used by Kurdish nationalists in the early twentieth century and onwards and 
became key sources for mapping Kurdistan. 
Orientalist perceptions of non-western peoples had strong perennialist and civilisationist lenses. These 
perceptions were informed by the studies and observations of Western geographers, military officers, 
economic entrepreneurs and missionary agents during their travels and engagements in non-western 
territories. Eastern territories of the Ottoman Empire, especially eastern Anatolia and Mesopotamia, 
became a focus area for Western imperial states in the late nineteenth century. This was partly because of 
economic and political reasons, such as trade routes and increased Russian influence in the area, as well as 
the presence of Christian populations. The geographical and ethnographic studies undertaken by European 
travelers and how they informed imperialist powers’ policies in the period leading up to, during and after 
World War I significantly influenced most of the territorial demarcations in the Middle East and the political 
fate of the Kurds. Even so, the resultant political and territorial settlement was also shaped by the strategic, 
economic and political interests of the imperial powers and the rivalries between them.  
This chapter focuses on the orientalist conceptions of the national identity of the non-western peoples, the 
peoples of the Ottoman Empire in this case. Western travellers’ and states’ perceptions of nationality 
informed the construction of a retrospective view on Kurdish national identity and territoriality today. 
Western conception of national identity was based on views that for a community to be considered as a 
nation, it needs to have a certain level of development, unified political leadership and a sense of shared 
identity and interest. However, Kurds were seen as a tribalistic, divided and underdeveloped society. As 
discussed by Ekrem Karakoç and Ege Özen, such views exhibit uncanny resemblances to the Turkish views 
of the Kurds in the early 21st century. 
Interestingly, the European ethnographic studies and cartographic depictions of the people of the region, 
including the Kurds, significantly informed the territorial conceptions of Kurdish national identity and the 
ways through which they constructed the Kurdish homeland. Indeed, European imperialism laid the 
groundwork for the world today and in this historical process geography played a significant role as “none 
of us is outside or beyond geography”.i Cartography had huge power in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries because it allowed for “achieving ideological supremacy over space”.ii Mapping reflects the wider 
ideological and political discourses and is the outcome of communication between cartographers, the goals 
of their study, the political offices and wider society.iii Neither territory nor its cartographic depictions can 
be taken for granted as static and ahistorical things. Maps are components of a “visual language” that 
communicates strategic interests and ideologies.iv Even when the aim for the production of a map is not 
propaganda, maps reflect unconscious biases and assumptions situated in the particular values, ideologies, 
political interests of the producer and the institutions and history they are situated in.v It is neither possible 
to escape geography nor the political and economic values and interests that shape its depictions and 
imaginations.  
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European context that affected Western states’ view of non-Western peoples 
 
Dominant political ideologies and the conceptions of development and political legitimacy in Europe in 
nineteenth century framed European actors’ perceptions of the Ottoman Empire and its peoples. 
Therefore, it is important to provide background for this historical European context and for the key 
political ideas that shaped this context.  
 
Nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe is characterised by increased centralisation of political and 
economic power and decision-making under militaristic nation-states. It also cultivated a form of 
imperialism that was driven by rivalry between these powerful states in most of the rest of the world.vi In 
this world, nationalism was one of the most significant political forces and ideologiesvii In the late eighteenth 
century, the British colonies in North America rejected the monarchical authority of the British Empire 
and declared American independence based on the notion of national sovereignty. Similarly, in Europe, the 
French Revolution was based on the ideas of nationhood, republicanism and liberty. Both revolutions saw 
the republican nation as the only legitimate form of political order to realise this latter goal of liberty.  
 
Nationalism provided the collective ideology and legitimacy for the state to undertake the endeavour to 
accomplish individual freedom through institutional arrangements. Nationalists envisioned the possibility 
of a community bound together through common memories, therefore they saw nationalism as a benign 
force. In this context, the ideal of a nation and nation-state were perceived to be imbued with certain values 
such as liberalism, capitalism, democratic institutions and popular sovereignty. In this model, the state could 
ensure a harmonious society and was seen as progressive if it embraced popular citizenship instead of 
imperial rule. viii  Collective governance, or democracy organised on national lines, defined as “the 
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide 
by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”ix emerged as the dominant form of governance 
over time.  
 
Democracy and nationalism complement each other because nationalist groups or movements seeking self-
determination see this goal as a democratic collective right.x By definition, the democratic enterprise has 
always been based on a defined group of people. As a result, constructing and defining a distinct nation 
came to be seen as a prerequisite for the formation of a democratic state. In turn, determining who belongs 
to ‘us’ and who should form the nation is seen as a prerequisite for this democratic endeavour. Building a 
state based on a claimed distinct identity is perceived as a rational route due to the belief that it brings 
solutions to political problems. It also provides suitable political and social circumstances for the 
advancement of better governance and development. Yet, history showed that the act to determine who 
belongs to the nation has also resulted dictatorial or violent forms of nationalism utilizing suppressive and 
non-democratic methods.xi 
 
A key outcome of this form of thinking in the nineteenth century-Europe was the emergence of self-
determination, defined as the ‘nationality principle’ or ‘self-governance’ at the time. Self-determination has 
become one of the most crucial international norms in relation to nationalist claims to justify separation 
from empires in the nineteenth century, gaining independence through decolonisation in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, and in shaping borders during the dismemberment of communist states at the end 
of the Cold War, as well as secessionist, irredentist or autonomist demands in other contexts.xii Self-
determination as a concept is widely discussed in the literature, and one thing that is agreed upon is the 
difficulty in defining this concept whether it is defined as a legal or political term. As a principle of 
international law, it is generally understood in a way that prioritises the stability of the international system 
and protects the sovereignty of states. Alternatively, it is interpreted as a political goal to achieve the rights of 
people to determine their political future, as a people of a state or in the form of autonomy or secession. 
Nationalist groups and their supporters (lobby groups, diasporas, states or international organisations) are 
proponents of this meaning of self-determination. Lastly, self-determination as an idea, as an analytical 
concept, is utilised in the scholarly work on nations and nationalism to understand state formation, nation 




In the nineteenth century, a civilizational interpretation of the ‘nationality principle’ was dominant. This 
view was dominated by the western orientalist thinking of the time, and argued that not all peoples are 
ready for self-governance. Only when they reach a required level of civilizational development should the 
nationality principle apply to a people.xiii By the end of the nineteenth century, the idea of a national identity 
had become a common sensical idea and nationality principle, , became a principle used in liberation 
movements against the imperial powers, notably the Habsburgs and the Ottomans, and establishing a new 
state. It was believed that when an independence movement achieves separation, it would be deemed a 
nation and would be able to establish its popular sovereignty over a defined territory and thus realise the 
ideal of popular national sovereignty. xiv  Especially after World War I, nationalist ideology and self-
determination became directly linked to popular sovereignty.xv  
 
Key characteristics of the logic of the state in nineteenth century Europe were industrial 
capitalism/development and centralisation, which coincided with the emerging nationalism in place of 
feudal and monarchical affiliations. This led to the perception that industrial development and nationalism 
go hand in hand, and a centralised economy, education system, military, police and bureaucracy were seen 
as the outcomes or products of the consolidation of national integration. The reverse is also possible; 
nationalism could be considered as the outcome of these centralising forces.xvi As a result of the coincidence 
of industrial capitalism, development and nationalism, the ideas of development and civilisation became 
associated with the nation, and its distinct identity, territory, culture, language and values. In this context, 
racial and ethnic groups that appeared to constitute the majority in a particular society were perceived to 
overlap with such processes. If this perceived overlap was present, a nationalist movement was seen to be 
a legitimate force or an entity to be taken seriously. Envisioning a national ideal and its ‘essence’ as a 
universal phenomenon (as autonomous, ahistorical and natural) has become an integral component of 
explaining state-building processes or attempts to form a state in the nineteenth century. The success of 
the German and Italian unifications and the maturing of the British and French (and American) 
nationalisms legitimized and popularized the idea that the nation-state is the progressive and universal 
political unit.  
 
What is important is that, the conception of nationhood and statehood in the nineteenth-century Europe 
and its overlap with development and industrial capitalism generated the lenses through which European 
colonial forces imagined the political future of non-European territories. They assumed that the 
consolidation of nation-states around specific identities within well-defined territories under a clear national 
leadership was an appropriate model for these areas as well. National communities were thought as entities 
with common identity traits and with a historical attachment to a defined territory and shared culture. This 
understanding of the nation was accompanied by the belief that nationalism and the nation-state are natural 
and progressive.xvii If such a people exist and if they have a nationalist leadership espousing these ideas, 
then they were seen to deserve being categorised as a national liberation movement. The lack of apparent 
shared identity or a nationalist leadership among a community or people were considered as indicators of 
backwardness. This rendered, in the orientalist perspective, these people as unable to govern themselves. 
European state officials, travelers, traders, and geographers often wrongly “projected upon local parochial 
communities the belief that national concerns not local issues should be at the forefront of local 




Western imaginations of ethnic geographies in the Ottoman Empire and the Kurdsxix 
 
European officers' and travellers’ studies and observations about the peoples of the eastern territories of 
the Ottoman Empire, including the Kurds, had an impact on the way Western policies were developed 
towards the Empire and its people during and after the World War. These views were both praising and 
critical of the Kurdish political elite and Kurdish society based on tribal structures. This highly biased view 
was an important factor in forming the perception that Kurds are not ready to attain statehood. For 
instance, thee studies undertaken by British colonial officers and travellers visiting eastern territories of the 
Ottoman Empire, including writers, anthropologists, linguists and geographers, saw the areas they explored 
and visited from this perspective, such as Mark Sykes’ ‘The Kurdish Tribes of the Ottoman Empire’ (1908), 
Francis Maunsell’ “Kurdistan” (1894) and Fredrick Millingen’s Wild Life among the Koords (1870). For 
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instance, Millingen extensively discussed the role of tribal feuds and intertribal war, and pointed to the 
primitive culture of the Kurds. Both Maunsell and Sykes reported on the intertribal fighting among Kurds, 
especially those that formed the Hamidiye regiments, and the negative impacts of this had on security the 
region.xx These writers also talked about the Hamidiye cavalry’s oppression of the Armenians. For instance, 
Maunsell wrote that Kurds were bigoted and constantly quarreled with Christians.xxi    
 
The European explorers’ and travellers’ explorations, activities and studies in non-European territories in 
the nineteenth century informed the way their states exerted power to reshape the political division of the 
Middle East in the early twentieth century. Orientalist constructions of geography were shaped and 
informed by political and cultural values in the European context, as explained in the previous section, the 
interests of the states and the different sources of information, including local informants and inter-




The western idea of a territorially contained peoples 
 
This section elaborates on the imaginations of ethnic territories by Western actors in their attempts to chart 
and map the East and its peoples, and generate new political boundaries during and after the dissolution of 
the Ottoman Empire. The underpinning ideas and views behind the western geographic study and mapping 
of non-Western territories and peoples in this period shaped the resultant imaginations. The western 
perspective projected an understanding of the nation (as experienced, or thought to be experienced in 
Europe) on rebel groups and the groups with distinct cultures and customs. In addition to this, 
accompanying the orientalist and colonial views on national identity and territoriality was the idea that the 
ability to form national unity around a specific identity and on a demarcated territory required a certain 
level of civilizational attainment, as explained in the previous section.  
 
The relationship between mapping and the construction of a nation or a people has changed over history. 
This relationship in each period is framed by global and regional power configurations and ideas about the 
world pertaining to that historical period. Processes and structures of a particular long-term historical 
period, and the international order it generates frame the assumptions, ideologies, perceptions and interests 
that underlie territorial imaginations. Moreover, political and ideological discourses at international, regional 
and local levels provide the supporting context for the production of geographical knowledge.xxii This 
means, the meaning of the territorial state (political entity) also differs in different international orders in 
which states can have distinct economic structures and different inter-state dynamics.  
 
Agnew identifies three such international orders in recent world history: 1815-1875, 1875-1945 and 1945-
1990. The first and part of the second period are particularly relevant for this chapter.xxiii In the 1815-1875 
international order, according to Agnew, European states reached a period of balance of power in their 
relationship. The Concert of Europe that emerged after the Napoleonic wars and nationalism came to be 
seen as the most apt legitimizing ideology for states and as an indicator of more superior systems and values 
of the western world vis-à-vis others. Agnew’s second international order from 1875 to 1945 was one of 
intensified rivalry between imperialist powers over control of and access to areas, trade routes and 
resources.xxiv In both these periods, an orientalist view of the non-western world and ideas of civilisation 
and underdevelopment shaped the perspective of the European travellers and their states, and informed 
perceptions about the peoples of the region and its mapping and study. 
 
Looking at what was happening in the first period (1815-1875) in the eastern territories of the Ottoman 
Empire, we see that western states, Italian, German and French travellers, missionaries and states were 
already active, including in the areas where Kurdish communities resided alongside other communities. 
Britain’s colonial power was on the rise and, as the century progressed, the British became increasingly 
more involved in the Middle East. European travellers were particularly interested in the fate of Christian 
populations. In the second period, especially until the end of World War I, European explorations were 
made mainly for strategic purposes to promote and protect state interest against other European states’ 
interests in the region. In this era, European powers were heavily involved in the demarcation of the 
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territories of the new states and in identifying the specific colonial power’s position and role in the 
governance of the new territory.xxv  
 
The sociological thinking in the nineteenth century in Europe, as explained in the previous section, further 
reinforced the idea of a political territorial state.xxvi Social science and geographers in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century contributed to the study of “state-centred political geographies, which reinforced 
the idea that the modern nation-state is natural and progressive.xxvii Nationalism or national identity, in this 
period, was believed to have an essence, an origin, which the nationalist intelligentsia tried to revive – an 
idea contemporary perennialist and ethno-symbolist approaches in the nationalism studies have 
explained.xxviii In nineteenth century Europe, three geographical assumptions were crystallised: (1) state 
territories became fixed units of sovereign space; 2) binary divisions set in such as national/international or 
domestic/foreign; 3) and the state came to be seen as a prior to and a container of society.xxix Enabled by 
these assumptions, a link between spatially demarcated territories and state sovereignty led to the ‘territorial 
trap’, and the fragmentation of the world into territorial states served as a justification for this trap.xxx The 
idea of the territorial state as the container of society became ‘common sensical’ and was reproduced. 
Popular sovereignty over an inhabited territory created a people-territory relationship in which territory 
began to define the people.xxxi 
 
This ideal state unit was filled with values that represented progress, liberalism, development and 
civilisation. These values and ideals underpinned the colonial powers’ perceptions of the other, their 
engagement with non-European contexts and the way they interpreted their findings and information they 
gathered through their explorations and studies. Peoples that do not appear to be progressive, liberal, or 
civilised were deemed not ready to attain the status of nationhood and establish a state of their own. These 
values informed Western states’ and their agents’ visualisation of the future of the Middle East and the 
Kurds in line with their strategic interests and the configurations shaped by the heightened imperial rivalry 
both leading up to and after the First World War.  
 
 
The orientalist geographic studies and interpretations of this period were complex and multidimensional. 
The European philosophical thinking and perspectives on the ideal and most progressive form of 
governance and the political unit were integral to colonial geographical studies and map-making. Western 
cartography presented Europe as civilised and powerful, at the centre of the earth, while the rest of the 
world was presented as uncivilised and weak. For instance, in the seventeenth and eighteenth century maps, 
Europe was put in a central and dominant position and it was even sometimes decorated into the physical 
shape of a queen stretching Europe’s tentacles around the globe with the world submitting to it.xxxii The 
European self-image presented in these maps, imbued with symbols, writings and drawings of peoples, 
depicted Europe as “powerful, civilised, clothed, and cultured; the rest of the world [as] subdued, exotic, 
savage, half-naked and primitive”.xxxiii This kind of iconography became less prominent in nineteenth 
century maps. This was due to the switch to more ‘scientific’ looking maps and advancement in mapping 
techniques (Black 2000). Despite the changes in mapping techniques, the orientalist view exemplified by 
such iconographies that informed earlier maps continued to exist in the studies of colonialist officers and 
travellers.  
 
In the colonial era, European powers and their agents, were heavily interested in objectifying, classifying 
and charting/mapping.xxxiv Colonial explorers, officers, engineers, geographers, and anthropologists were 
driven to create rational and universal knowledge about the world. Therefore, map-making and geographic 
work even for purely exploratory and economic reasons tried to identify unifying or dominant identity 
markers such as language, customs, religion in their study of the peoples in the Middle East in Ottoman 
and Iranian imperial territories. They usually depicted the non-Western as underdeveloped, uncivilised, 
tribal and primitive, therefore, undeserving of national self-determination, which in their thinking justified 
colonisation. When it comes to the Middle East, such perspectives were especially targeted at non-Christian 
communities. For instance, the Christian communities in these territories, such as Armenians, Assyrians, 
Nestorians, were depicted as less backward and with less degrading language. With regards to the Kurds, 
some travellers described Kurds more favourably compared to Arabs and Turkmans and blamed the 
underdeveloped and uncivilised life among the Kurds on their Ottoman and Persian rulers.xxxv Others 
described Kurds as uncivilised and argued the Ottoman and Persian rulers have not managed to change 
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them. They were also portrayed to be inferior to Christians in terms of intellect and to have savage 
characteristics.xxxvi   
 
 
Kurds and Kurdistan in the eyes of Western travellers 
  
European travellers and writers visited the Kurdish populated region as state agents, army officers, 
scientists, researchers or journalists in the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth century, and they 
created numerous definitions and cartographic depictions of Kurdistan. They were interested in Kurdistan 
for several reasons and these reasons influenced their findings and the way they conducted research. Initially 
the western interest in the region was for economic and religious purposes. Kurdistan is located on 
important communication and trade routes, therefore they produced a number of writings, reports and 
maps for economic purposes, which included references to and observations about the Kurds and 
Kurdistan.  
 
Italian merchants were among the earliest travellers to Kurdistan and they were interested in the trade 
routes going through the area and the region’s economic potential. They wrote the oldest European 
accounts, including the first Kurdish grammar book and dictionary in 1789, and produced several other 
writings on the political structures and geographical location and features.xxxvii German travellers also had 
been writing about Kurdistan since the eighteenth century based on their study of the region and its 
features, particularly the transport routes. German engagement was further facilitated by its close 
relationship with the Ottoman Empire from the mid-nineteenth century onward.xxxviii Germans invested a 
big share of funding for the Baghdad Railway Project, whose construction started in 1903, envisioned to 
go through Kurdistan. The British were also interested in trade and economic benefits initially; for instance, 
the East India Company was very active in the region. Similarly, the French were engaged in economic 
activities and had extensive economic links with the Ottoman Empire. The French had built railway lines 
in Ottoman territoryxxxix and had a 40 percent share in the Baghdad Railway Project. Russians produced the 
earliest accounts of the trade routes in the region.xl  
 
Western states, particularly Italy, France and the United States, and later the British, were also heavily 
engaged in missionary activities in the eastern territories of the Ottoman Empire. They were particularly 
focused on the Christian communities. American missionaries, active in Kurdistan since the early 
nineteenth century, published several studies and reports on the Kurds. Italian and French Catholic 
missionaries carried out activities in the region, especially in the Mosul Province of the Ottoman Empire, 
and members of these missions wrote about different aspects of the Kurdish way of life, religion and 
geography. xli  The missionaries’ close focus on local Christians influenced their and other Westerner 
perspectives of Kurds and Muslims. It also played a role in the deterioration of inter-communal relations 
in the region. Westerners distinguished between local Christians and Muslims and perceived the former 
being more “civilized”, while still maintaining a more pejorative view of all the locals in these territories, 
including Christians. The Russian and the French devoted particular attention to the Armenians in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, which added to the tension in communal relations between Kurds 
and Armenians.xlii In turn, as discussed by Ohannes Kılıçdağı in his chapter in this volume, Armenian 
intellectuals perceived Kurds as “uncivilized” but argued that it was in the best interest of the Armenian 
community to help Kurds achieve a higher level of development.  
 
The maps and reports the Europeans produced mainly relied on their studies and observations, but it is 
likely that they came across earlier descriptions of Kurdistan by Muslim historians and travellers such as 
Şerefhan, Evliya Çelebi and Koyi. For instance, Rawlinson, a traveller and military officer, who visited the 
areas northern Mesopotamia and the Zagros mountains, read the Sharafname (1596) written by the ruler of 
the Ottoman Emirate of Bitlis.xliii  Yet there was limited writing and cartographic work on Kurdistan 
produced by local researchers in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Therefore, it is safe to say that 
Europeans’ cartographic study of the area and its people mainly relied on their orientalist point of view and 
colonial epistemologies and methodologies of geography. Such a perspective projected and interpreted 
information gathered through a colonial perspective, essentialising what is studied. For instance, European 
travellers and writers adopted the myth that Kurds were the descendants of the Medes despite lack of 




In the second half of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, the European states became even 
more interested in these areas due to intensified imperial rivalry. Therefore, their strategic interests played 
a significant role in their interpretations of the local context. Each imperial state wanted to gain political 
and economic supremacy in the region. Particularly the Baghdad Railway project increased the importance 
of the area and escalated imperial rivalry as each power wanted to enjoy the highest benefit from this new 
transport and communication route.xlv Russians further expanded their interests in Caucasia and its south 
due to increasing involvement by other European powers in the area. These Western powers as well as 
Ottoman and Iranian powers considered this a threat.xlvi The imperial rivalries in the region shaped the 
future of most of the region, which in the long-term led to the frustration of the Kurdish nationalist desire 
to statehood after World War I.  
 
European travellers produced several maps of the region, including maps depicting Kurdistan. One of the 
first maps produced by a Western traveller was that by English traveller Claudius Rich who visited the 
Middle Eastern territories of Ottoman and Iranian Empires in the first two decades of the nineteenth 
century. xlvii  The Germans in 1854 later produced an ethnographic map of Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Kurdistan, which illustrated trade routes.xlviii Karstov, a Russian military officer, produced a map of Kurdish 
tribes in 1896 (O’Shea 2004: 112). The first map that specifically focused on Kurdistan was produced by 
Maunsell, a British military officer, after his travels in the region in 1892. The map provided detailed 
information on the geography of Kurdistan, Kurdish habitation and habitation by other communities.xlix 
The British Government used Maunsell’s projections of the ethnographic composition of the area when 
strategic plans about the region were being made in the period before World War I. The British Foreign 
Office’s ethnographic map of the area, produced in 1919 (but relying on data from prior to the First World 
War) reflected the Foreign Office’s position on the territorial extent of Armenian habitation. O’Shea states 
that this was because at the end of the War, the Allied forces wanted to weaken Ottoman territorial claims 
in eastern Anatolia and therefore produced a map that indicated large Christian habitation in the region.l   
 
The colonial and imperial powers also took a direct role to influence boundary drawing in the eastern 
territories of the Ottoman Empire as early as mid-nineteenth century. The boundary between the Ottomans 
and Persians was set in 1639 with the Zohab Treaty and demarcated a wide border area (about 100 
kilometres), in which several Kurdish tribes were located. The demarcation of this border between Turkey 
and Iran involved significant European presence was not finalised until the 1910s.li This location provided 
the Kurds some degree of autonomy and they were able to change alliances between the two empires as it 
fit them. This location made the Kurds and other communities living in this zone vulnerable because they 
were easily manipulated by external imperial powers and their specific interests. The maps produced in this 
period played an important role in the drawing of boundaries before and after the First World War, 
including Maunsell’s maps.lii 
 
The studies and explorations undertaken in Kurdistan and the reports and outputs produced by European 
travellers and their governments’ officials in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were used to 
formulate European states’ policy with regards to the Kurds before, during and after the First World War. 
Ironically, the cartographic information on the Kurds and anthropological studies on their distinct features 
also constituted the foundation of Kurdish nationalist cartography and historiography later in the twentieth 
century. Kurdish nationalists replicated these maps or improvised on them to imagine the Kurdish 
homeland and its extent. Maunsell’s and other travellers’ maps became widely accepted and used by Kurdish 
nationalists, who improvised on them and produced their own maps in the early twentieth century and 
later.liii  
 
For instance, Sherif Pasha’s map included in the Memorandum demanding Kurdish self-determination in 
1919 at the Paris Peace Conference was constructed based on the maps produced by Western travellers, 
British and German armies and entrepreneurs in the region.liv The Conference hosted many delegations 
representing different peoples and groups, however not all these delegations were given official hearings, 
including the Kurdish delegation. Sherif Pasha,lv an Ottoman diplomat in Paris, acted as the Kurdish 
representative to the British Ambassador in Paris and as the head of the Kurdish Delegation to the 
Conference. The Pasha prepared a Memorandum on the Claims of the Kurd People (Kurdish 
Memorandum) that included a map of Kurdistan that he produced. At the Conference, maps were widely 
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used by multiple different delegations as tools to persuade others of the existence of territorially identifiable 
peoples that should be considered as nations around the worldlvi and the Kurdish representation was no 
exception to this. Sherif Pasha’s Memorandum demanded a free Kurdish state and its main goal was to 
show the soundness of Kurdish demands against Armenian claims. It argued that the districts claimed by 
the Armenians were actually within the boundaries of Turkish Kurdistan and stated that if contested 
districts were to be included in the new Armenia, disorder and irregular warfare would be inevitable.lvii It 
defined the ethnographic frontiers of Turkish Kurdistan as follows: 
 
in the North at Ziven, on the Caucasian frontier, and continue westwards to Erzéroum, Erzindjan, 
Kémah, Arabkir, Benismi, and Divick; in the South they follow the line from Haran, the Sindjihar 
Hills, Tel Asfar, Erbil. Kerkuk, Suléimanié, Akk-el-man, Sinna; in the East, Ravandiz, Bash-Kalé, 
Vizir-Kalé, that is to say the frontier of Persia as far as Mount Ararat.lviii  
 
However, Sherif Pasha was not considered representative of the Kurds by the European powers and, 
despite Pasha’s efforts, eventually it was not taken seriously by the British.lix The Pasha was neither chosen 
nor supported by powerful local Kurdish leaders either and came to be seen as disconnected from the 
Kurdish masses and Kurdish leaders in Istanbul. The Conference received a series of telegrams from 
Kurdish chieftains stating that they did not recognise Sherif Pasha as a legitimate representative and 
protested against his map of Kurdistan. Emin Ali Bedirhan, one of the leaders of the Society for the 
Advancement of the Kurds in Istanbul, vehemently opposed to Pasha’s plans, especially the extent of 
Kurdistan on his map.lx Sherif Pasha’s map left the Lake Van area, which was considered as the heart of 
the Armenian homeland, out of his map of Kurdistan. It is said that the Pasha also made a secret 
arrangement with the Armenian Delegation for the formation of both Armenia and Kurdistan.lxi Some 
other Kurdish chieftains also sent telegraphs to the conference to condemn Sherif Pasha’s initiative for a 
Kurdish state and to assert that they did not want separation from the Turks, emphasising their fraternity 
instead.lxii The Pasha resigned from his position as Kurdish representative April 1920 and from this point 
on, the British interacted directly with local leaders.lxiii 
 
 
Post-World War I settlement and the Kurds 
 
In the early twentieth century and after, western states continued to engage with the Kurds, to carry out 
their missions and interests in the region. However, they did not give full support to the idea of Kurdish 
state. European colonial officers and travellers projection of a European understanding of the nation and 
their perspectives on the peoples of the Ottoman Empire through these lenses contributed to the view that 
the Kurds did not have the characteristics of a nation and were not seen as a legitimate group to deserve 
national liberation because of the Kurdish society’s ‘under-developed’, tribal and divided nature. The 
discussions about the Kurds during World War I period are clear indicators of such perceptions.  
 
Especially the British, who played a significant role in shaping the political fate of the Kurds in this period, 
perceived the fragmented and multiple Kurdish voices and rivalries between different leaders as a drawback 
and an impediment for forming a Kurdish state.lxiv Lloyd George, the British prime minister between 1916 
and 1922, wrote “no Kurds seemed to represent anything more than his own particular clan”.lxv This was 
seen as a stark contrast to the coherent, stronger and unified Armenian movement supported by an 
influential and well-organised Armenian representation.lxvi Perceptions about the Kurdish dividedness and 
unreadiness to form their own state have continued to shape the political discourse about the Kurds until 
present. The role of the Kurds in the suppression of minorities and treatment of Armenians under Ottoman 
rule, especially through their involvement in the Hamidiye Cavalry under the Abdulhamid II’s reign, also 
tainted the perceptions of Western actors towards the Kurds and weakened the case for a Kurdish states.lxvii 
 
During the Paris Peace Conference, it was decided that the Ottoman territories would be divided between 
the British, French, Italians and the Greeks. However, these external actors had different expectations and 
plans for the territories. Rivalries and dynamics within this cohort of countries made it hard to decide the 
territorial boundaries of potential political entities. Each external actor wanted new political entities to help 
fulfill their own economic, political and strategic plans in the region. In the end, European influence over 
the eastern territories of the Ottoman Empire, remained limited even if territories south of these lands, 
 
9 
which included the Mosul province with its significant Kurdish population, divided and put under British 
and French mandates (later Iraq and Syria respectively).  
 
The provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres pertaining to the Kurds showed that the nineteenth century views 
that Kurds were considered as being unready for national attainment were still shaping the thinking of the 
European powers after World War I. Signed in August 1920 between the Ottoman Empire and the 
victorious powers (but not ratified), the Treaty set the terms for the partition of the Ottoman territories 
and its Articles 62-64 dealt with the status of the Kurds. The Kurdish nationalist historiography usually sees 
the Treaty of Sèvres as a legal guarantee for the establishment of a Kurdish state and argue that if it was 
implemented a Kurdish state would have been established. However, a closer look at the Sèvres document 
shows that the guarantee appears far more elusive than assumed. The Article 64 of the Treaty makes 
reference to the capacity of the Kurds to become independent, implying civilizational and national 
attainment and readiness for forming a state:  
 
If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish peoples 
within the areas defined in Article 62 shall address themselves to the Council of the League 
of Nations in such a manner as to show that a majority of the population of these areas 
desires independence from Turkey, and if the Council then considers that these peoples are 
capable of such independence and recommends that it should be granted to them, Turkey 
hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over 
these areas.  
 
The British had abandoned the idea of creating a Kurdish state during the 1919 Paris Conference and Sèvres 
Treaty’s relevant article were not only limited in allowing for the creation of a Kurdish state but also were 
not implemented. The only area where self-determination was implemented for Kurds, albeit in a very 
limited and a procedural form, was north Mesopotamia. In this area, the British created a semi-autonomous 
regional administration called Sulaymaniyah in 1918, in accordance with the ideals of President Wilson’s 
Point 12.lxviii However, this administrative rule came to a quick end when Mahmoud Barzinji, the head of 





Maps and geographic studies typically “reflect and recreate dominant geopolitical discourses” and in the 
nineteenth century these were linked to orientalist discourses.lxix In these orientalist discourses, national 
identity began to be geographically imagined and territorialised, which was the outcome of constructions 
of national identity and nationalism in the nineteenth century. Spatial categories began to be used to 
categorise peoples and their ethnic and linguistic characteristics. Such categories started to attain significant 
explanatory power in studying and mapping nationalism and ethnicity not only in Europe but in other parts 
of the world as well. Ethnographic maps produced by European travellers and geographers are excellent 
examples of this kind of thinking. The idea of national territory in the state-centred political geography 
became an essential and taken-for-granted entity and its presence was seen as a stage (and component) in 
the social and national advancement and development of a peoplelxx to reach to the level of civilisation as 
experienced in the European context. Such perspectives were ingrained into the nineteenth century and 
early twentieth century political geography and map-making by colonial geographers and officials.  
 
European travellers’ accounts reflect the values and perceptions of the travellers who were representatives 
of the states that ultimately decided the political future of the region. The orientalist view of the world 
perceiving non-European peoples as less civilised and underdeveloped informed these accounts. The 
civilizational understanding of nationalism that considers national consciousness, the degree of shared 
history, language and culture as an indicator of readiness and criteria for being considered as candidates to 
join the family of nations constituted the lens through which the European travellers and officers saw the 
Kurds and other peoples of the region. These European cultural and political values were considered as 
universal and this perception of universality and superiority informed their views. In addition, their own 
relatively positive bias towards Christian and other non-Muslim communities also informed their accounts 




The studies and explorations undertaken in Kurdistan and the reports produced by European travellers and 
their governments’ officials were used to formulate European states’ policy with regards to the Kurds 
before, during and after the First World War. Crucially, the geographical information and anthropological 
studies about the Kurds constituted the foundation of Kurdish nationalist cartography and historiography 
in the following decades of the twentieth century. Kurdish nationalists replicated these maps or improvised 
on them to imagine the Kurdish homeland and its extent. Today the map of greater Kurdistan, extending 
from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, produced by Kurdish nationalists has become a key symbol 
of Kurdish national identity and is being used widely by the Kurds. The idea of an independent Kurdistan 
at some point in the future when the circumstances allow, resonates with many Kurds, both in the region 
and the diaspora.  
 
Kurds have benefited from significant international and transnational opportunities over the twentieth 
century and early twenty-first century. For instance, international support for Kurdish self-governance in 
the form of autonomy within a federal Iraq continues. The US and other western countries have established 
a strategic and military alliance with Kurds in Syria in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, 
an alliance that received a fatal blow when the US let a Turkish incursion into the Kurdish controlled 
northeastern Syria in fall 2019. Kurdish political actors have engaged with contemporary dominant norms, 
such as democracy, human rights, minority rights and gender equality and self-determination to solicit 
support for their political legitimacy. However, this does not mean that the international community is 
ready to support a Kurdish state. Neither the United States, the United Kingdom nor regional countries 
consider Kurdish secession from Iraq as an acceptable option.lxxi The lack of international support for the 





Agnew, John (1994), ‘The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations 
Theory’, Review of International Political Economy 1 (1): 53-80. 
 
Alsancakli, Sacha (2017), ‘Matrimonial Alliances and the Transmission of Dynastic Power in Kurdistan: 
The Case of the Diyādīnids of Bidlīs in the Fifteenth to Seventeenth Centuries’, Eurasian Studies 15: 222-
49. 
 
Ateş, Sabri (2013), Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands: Making a Boundary, 1843-1914, New York: Cambridge 
University Press.   
 
Bajalan, Djene Rhys (2019), ‘The First World War, the End of the Ottoman Empire, and Question of 
Kurdish Statehood: A ‘Missed’ Opportunity?’, Ethnopolitics, 18 (1): 13-28.  
 
Bozarslan, H. (2003), ‘Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey: From Tacit Contract to Rebellion’, in: A. Vali 
(ed.), Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism, 163-90, California: Mazda.  
 
Breuilly, John (1993), Nationalism and the State, Manchester: Manchester University Press.  
 
Crampton, Jeremy W. and Krygier, J. (2006), ‘An Introduction to Critical Cartography’, ACME: An 
International E-Journal for Critical Geographies, 4 (1): 11-33. 
 
Culcasi, Karen (2006), ‘Cartographically Constructing Kurdistan within Geopolitical and Orientalist 
Discourses’, Political Geography, 25 (6): 680-706. 
 
Diamond, Larry and Marc F. Plattner (eds.) (1994), Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy, Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press. 
 




UK House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee (2018), ‘Kurdish Aspirations and the Interests of 
the UK’, Third Report of Session 2017-19.  
 
Freeden, Michael (1998), Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach, Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
 
Harley, J. B. (1989), ‘Deconstructing the Map’, Cartographica, 26 (2): 1-20.  
 
Harley, J. B. and David Woodward (eds.) (1987), The History of Cartography, Volume 1: Cartography in 
Prehistoric, Ancient, and Medieval Europe and the Mediterranean, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.   
 
Helmreich, Paul C. (1974), From Paris to Sèvres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 
1979-1920, Columbus: Ohio State University Press.  
 
House, Edward Mandell and Seymour, Charles (eds.) (1921), What Really Happened at Paris, the Story of the 
Peace Conference 1918-19 / by American Delegates. London. 
 
Klein, Janet (2007), ‘Kurdish Nationalists and Non-Nationalist Kurdists: Rethinking Minority 
Nationalism and the Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-9’, Nations and Nationalism, 13 (1): 135-
153.  
 
Knight, David B. (1985), ‘Territory and People or People and Territory? Thoughts on Postcolonial Self-
Determination’, International Political Science Review, 6 (2): 248-272.  
 
Kurdish Delegation to the Peace Conference. (1919), Memorandum on the Claims of the Kurd People, Prepared 
by General Şerif Pasha, Paris.  
 
Laughlin, Jim Mac (1986), ‘The Political Geography of ‘Nation-Building and Nationalism in Social 
Sciences: Structural vs. Dialectical Accounts’, Political Geography Quarterly, 5 (4): 299-329.  
 
Macmillan, M. (2002), Peacemakers: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and its Attempt to End War, London: 
John Murray.  
 
Maunsell, F. R. (1894), ‘Kurdistan’, Geographic Journal, 3 (2): 81-92. 
 
Maunsell, F. R. (1890), ‘Reconnaissances in Mesopotamia, Kurdistan, North-West Persia, and Luristan 
from April to October 1888’, Vol 2, Simla: Intelligence Branch, Quarter Master General’s Dept, [114v] 
(233/312). 
 
McDowall, David (1996), A Modern History of the Kurds. London: I. B. Tauris. 
 
McMurray, Jonathan S. (2001), Distant Ties: Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the Construction of the Baghdad 
Railway, Westport: Praeger Publishers.  
 
Meiselas, Susan, (2008), Kurdistan: In the Shadow of History, Second Ed., Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
 
Mignan, Robert D. (1839), Winter Journey Through Russia, the Caucasian Alps and Georgia: Thence 
Across Mount Zagros by the Pass of Xenophon and the Ten Thousand Greeks, into Koordistaun, 2 
Vols, London: Richard Bentley.  
 
Millingen, Fredrick (1870), Wild Life Among the Koords, London: Hurst and Blackett. 
  
Muhammad, Qadir Muhammad (2017). ‘Kurds and Kurdistan in the View of British Travellers in the 




O’Shea, Maria. T. (2004), Trapped Between the Map and Reality: Geography and Perceptions of Kurdistan, London: 
Routledge. 
 
Özoğlu, Hakan (2004), Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State: Evolving Identities, Competing Loyalties, and 
Shifting Boundaries, Albany: State University of New York Press. 
 
Rawlinson, H.C. (1839), ‘Notes on a March from Zohab, at the Foot of Zagros, along the Mountains of 
Khuzistan (Susiana), and from Thence Through the Province of Luristan to Kirmanshah, in the Year 
1836’, Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of London, 9: 26-116. 
 
Rich, Claudius James (1836), Narrative of a Residence in Koordistan, and on the Site of Ancient Nineveh, 2 Vols, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Said, Edward. (1994), Culture and Imperialism, London: Vintage.  
 
Sidaway, James D. (2000), ‘Postcolonial Geographies: An Exploratory Essay’, Progress in Human Geography, 
24 (4): 591-612.  
 
Smith, Anthony D. (2004), The Antiquity of Nations, Oxford: Polity. 
 
Sykes, M. (1904). Dar-ul-Islam, London: Draft Publishers Ltd.  
 
Tilly, Charles (1994), ‘States and Nationalism in Europe 1492-1992’, Theory and Society, 23 (1): 131-146. 
 
Tyner, Judith A. (1982), ‘Persuasive Cartography’, Journal of Geography, 82 (4): 140-144. 
 
Van Bruinessen, Martin (1992), Agha, Shaikh and the State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan, New 
Jersey: Zed.  
 
Wintle, Michael (1999), ‘Renaissance Maps and the Construction of the Idea of Europe’, Journal of 





i Said 1994: 6 
ii Wintle 1999: 137 
iii Ibid. 138 
iv Harley 1983 
v Tyner 1982; Harley and Woodward 1987: 2 
vi Laughlin 1986: 322 
vii Although according to Freeden (1998) nationalism is not a full ideology, the way it was used to justify state 
formations and policies in the nineteenth century could qualify it as an ideology. In other contexts, nationalism can 
also be a sentiment or a movement. 
 
xv Diamond and Plattner 1994: xii 
xvi Tilly 1994; Breuilly 1993 
xvii Laughlin 1986: 300 
xviii Ibid. 308 
xix This section uses O’Shea’s excellent analysis of the European engagement with the Kurds and other peoples in 
the area, and her archival research on European mapping in eastern Ottoman territories in the nineteenth century.   
xx Sykes, Dar-ul-Islam, p. 202; Maunsell, Reconnaissances in Mesopotamia, Kurdistan, vol. 2, 166. For an excellent analysis 
of the British travellers’ accounts of the Kurds and Kurdistan in the nineteenth century, see Muhammad 2017.  
xxi Maunsell, Reconnaissances in Mesopotamia, Kurdistan, p. 166.  
xxii Crampton 2001: 235 






xxiv Ibid. 67 
xxv The third international period Agnew refers to from 1945 to 1990 is outside the focus of this chapter. This 
period was one in which “interstate competition and conflict were largely transformed by the US reconstruction of 
the industrial capitalist state along liberal capitalist lines.” (Ibid. 67). 
xxvi Ibid. 64, 69 
xxvii Laughlin 1986: 301; 307-308 
xxviii Smith 2004. 
xxix Agnew 1994: 53-59 
xxx Ibid. 60 
xxxi Knight 1985: 250-251 
xxxii Wintle 1999: 152 
xxxiii Ibid. 160 
xxxiv Sidaway 2000: 592; Said 1978 
xxxv Rawlinson 1839; Rich 1836.  
xxxvi Mignan 1839.  
xxxvii O’Shea 2004: 109-114 
xxxviii The railway connecting Berlin and Istanbul and the role of German military in the reformation of the Ottoman 
army were important factors. 
xxxix 1,266 km by the end of the nineteenth century. 
xl O’Shea 2004: 114 
xli Meiselas 2008: 2-50 
xlii O’Shea 2004: 108-113 
xliii Rawlinson 1839; Alsancakli 2017. 
xliv O’Shea 2000: 65 
xlv McMurray 2001 
xlvi O’Shea 2004: 112-113 
xlvii Ibid. 
xlviii Ibid. 108 
xlix Ibid. 110 
l Ibid. 48 
li For the decades long process of border demarcation, see Ateş 2013. 
lii Ibid. 125 
liii Ibid. 107 
liv Ibid. 
lv The Pasha was raised in Istanbul and had Kurdish origins. 
lvi House and Seymour 1921: 14 
lvii Kurdish Memorandum: 3 
lviii Ibid. 12 
lix McDowall 1996: 122 
lx Özoğlu 2004: 39-40; Bozarslan 2003: 169. Sayyid Abdulkadir, the other leader of the SAK and rival to Emin Ali 
Bedirhan, supported Şerif Pasha’s efforts at the Paris Peace Conference. 
lxi Bozarslan 2003: 169; Olson 1991: 399 
lxii Van Bruinessen 1992: 279; Bozarslan 2003: 172. 
lxiii O’Shea 2004: 129 
lxiv O’Shea 2004, pp. 117-118. For the lack of international support for the Kurdish state in the post-World War I 
period, see Bajalan 2019. 
lxv Quoted in Macmillan, 2002: 458, from Lloyd George’s diary.  
lxvi Helmreich 1974.  
lxvii Klein 2007.  
lxviii Edmonds 1971: 92. Point 12 in Wilson’s Fourteen Poinuts: “The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman 
Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should 
be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity, security of life and an absolutely 
unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free 
passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.” 
lxix Culcasi 2006: 680 
lxx Laughlin 1986: 321 
lxxi UK House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee 2018.  
